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ABSTRACT
At the beginning of the 1970s it was easy to believe that the road ahead for Indonesia 
was difficult. But as the decade unfolded, the changes across the Indonesian economy, 
and the sustained growth, surpassed all expectations. Numerous dramatic events seized 
Indonesian and international attention during the 1970s including corruption issues, 
the 1972 rice crisis, the Malari riots of early 1974, and the impact of the first oil boom 
including the Pertamina crisis. Anne Booth and I reviewed these developments in 
our edited collection of articles on The Indonesian economy during the Soeharto era. 
Looking back, our edited volume captured the excitement of the 1970s and, perhaps, 
was rather too cautious in looking towards the further gains that changes in the next 
few decades would bring to Indonesia.
Keywords: Indonesian economy, Soeharto era, Crisis
INTRODUCTION
Over three decades ago Anne Booth and I cooperated to edit The Indonesian 
Economy during the Soeharto Era. The collection (Booth and McCawley 
1981) was one of the first major surveys of economic developments in 
Indonesia during the early part of the Orde Baru period. We prepared our 
edited collection at the end of the 1970s, a decade during which Indonesia 
experienced both turbulent economic times and much economic progress. As 
a contribution to recognizing the remarkable contribution that colleague Anne 
Booth has made towards the study of both the Indonesian economy and global 
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development issues, it seems appropriate to revisit the view of the Indonesian 
economy that we presented together at the end of president Soeharto’s first 
decade in office. Looking back, our edited volume captured the excitement of 
the 1970s and, perhaps, was rather too cautious in looking towards the further 
gains that changes in the next few decades would bring to Indonesia.
THE 1970S IN INDONESIA
At the beginning of the 1970s it was easy to believe that the road ahead for 
Indonesia was difficult. There had been a recovery of sorts in the late 1960s, 
and in 1969 a new five-year plan, Repelita I (Rencana Pembangunan Lima 
Tahun I) had been launched. Nevertheless the challenges ahead looked very 
daunting, partly because the resources available to support any sustained 
development program seemed so meagre. But as the 1970s unfolded the 
changes across the Indonesian economy, and the sustained growth, surpassed 
all expectations. To be sure, there were many difficulties, and there were some 
bad policy mistakes. Yet throughout the decade, the Indonesian economy 
steadily grew in strength.
The Commission of Four. Looking back over the 1970s, the contrasts 
between the progress and the problems in Indonesia is striking. One of the 
first surprising events of the decade related to an issue which had plagued 
Indonesia for many years and which has continued to be a headline issue ever 
since – corruption. In January 1970, in response to student protests and press 
criticism, president Soeharto announced that a ‘Commission of Four’ would 
be appointed to report on corruption within the Indonesian civil service. Jamie 
Mackie summarized the mood of the day as follows:
Corruption is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. It was becoming almost 
endemic under the Sukarno regime … where financial accountability 
virtually collapsed because of administrative deterioration. … The change 
in the political temper of the country between 1965 and 1970 is also 
relevant. Corruption was a source of frequent complaints in the Sukarno era, 
but it was a relatively minor political issue since so many more contentious 
conflicts loomed much larger … Today, there are few other burning issues 
of comparable horse-power for opponents or critics of the regime. (Mackie 
1970: 87-88)
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The full contents of the report became available, perhaps in an unintended 
way, when the well-known Jakarta daily Sinar Harapan obtained a copy of 
the document and proceeded to publish it in full in July 1970. The following 
month president Soeharto, in his Independence Day speech to parliament, 
spoke of his determination to lead the fight against corruption personally. 
In retrospect, it can be seen that president Soeharto was doing what every 
president of Indonesia (and dozens, probably thousands of other political 
figures in Indonesia) has done since – boldly announce measures to investigate 
and curb corruption but, in the end, leave the nation deeply disappointed with 
the results.
1972 rice crisis. Another major problem arose for Indonesian economy policy- 
makers in 1972 when a serious drought occurred across Southeast Asia leading 
to low rice production in the region and pressure on rice prices. The dry season 
in 1972 was especially dry. However effective crop monitoring procedures did 
not exist so neither officials in the field nor policy-makers in Jakarta realized 
that there was a problem until prices started rising. By August and September 
it had become obvious that a shortfall in production was looming. To make 
matters worse, world rice stocks were at a very low level, world rice prices 
were rising quickly, and emergency imports of rice were hard to obtain. Within 
several months, market prices of rice doubled in some parts of Indonesia 
putting upward pressure on other prices as well and causing widespread 
hardship amongst poorer sections of the population.
The rice crisis of late 1972, and the sudden end to economic stability sent 
shock waves through senior echelons of the Indonesian government. The 
events of late 1972 underlined the fact that economic stability in Indonesia 
(and perhaps political stability as well) was still very fragile. The repercussions 
of the crisis had a number of implications for policy-making over the following 
few years.
For one thing, the Indonesian government increased the focus on the issue 
of food security (especially rice security). President Soeharto showed every 
sign of being aware of the maxim that ‘an army marches on its stomach’ 
(although, in this case, it was the nation). During October and November in
1973 president Soeharto regularly met with officials from the national rice 
agency BULOG (Badan Urusan Logistik, or the Logistics Board) and held 
sessions with the Economic Stabilisation subcommittee of cabinet to discuss 
the rice situation (Dwipayana & Sjamsuddin 1991: 490).
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For another thing, new programs to strengthen food security were implemented 
which influenced the approach to rice policy in Indonesia for the rest of the 
decade and into the 1980s. For example, the nation-wide rice marketing 
and procurement systems were strengthened working through rural semi- 
cooperatives, BUUDs (Badan Usaha Unit Desa) and full cooperatives, 
KUDs (Koperasi Unit Desa). In addition, ambitious plans were announced to 
strengthen BULOG, including the goal of establishing a national buffer stock 
of one million tons of rice. And, indeed, considerable progress was made 
throughout the decade. Although the operations of BULOG were often the 
subject of much comment, including many suggestions of mismanagement 
and personal aggrandisement on the part of BULOG officials, by the end 
of the 1970s many of the goals had been substantially achieved. By 1979, an 
impressive network of modern warehouses with a total capacity of one million 
tons had been built across Indonesia.
Malari. The 1972-73 rice crisis also contributed to the rising tide of discontent 
across Indonesia in 1973 which erupted in the dramatic Malari (Malapetaka 
Lima  belas  Januari,  or  ‘15th  of  January  disaster’)  riots  in  Jakarta  and 
other major Indonesian cities in January 1974. During the several days of 
sustained rioting, thousands of students took to the streets in anti-government 
demonstrations, much damage was done, including looting of shops and 
burning of cars in large cities, and the armed forces along with tanks were 
mobilised to restore order. The nominal trigger for the riots was a visit by 
Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka to Jakarta in mid-January. However other 
causes included resentment over various aspects of economic policy, especially 
rising prices and resentment at Japanese commercial influence in Indonesia, 
and divisions within the Indonesian military (Wanandi 2012: 112).
The Malari episode quickly led to a change of mood in Indonesia, not least 
within the upper echelons of government. President Soeharto moved decisively 
to bolster his power. Key military personnel were reassigned and a number 
of daily newspapers and weekly magazines were banned. In discussing the 
implications of the Malari riots, Wanandi (2012: 119) notes that ‘Never again 
did Soeharto allow his ministers, generals and advisors as much leeway.’ There 
were swift adjustments in economic policy as well. There was a tightening 
of the rules on foreign investment to close down some sectors to foreign 
investment and a closer examination of the role of Japanese investment in 
Indonesia. These moves were intended to demonstrate that policies during 
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the earlier part of the Orde Baru in the direction of liberalization of foreign 
investment policies had been sharply revised.
The first oil boom. But at the same time that the Malari riots were taking 
place a tectonic change in global economic conditions was occurring: the 
first great oil boom of the 1970s was underway. This change would transform 
the environment for growth and development in Indonesia for the rest of 
the decade. The price of oil had started climbing almost two years earlier. 
However the price of other commodities was rising as well and so for a time 
policy-makers both in Indonesia and around the world did not realise what 
was happening. In April 1972 the oil price received by Indonesia was around
$2.90 per barrel. One year later it was $3.70. By November 1973 it had risen 
to $6.00. And then it rose again, climbing to over $10.00 in January 1974. 
By mid- 1974 it was clear that the international economic environment was 
changing in a dramatic way. Writing in the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies in July 1974, Heinz Arndt observed that
The increase in the price of Indonesian crude oil … has transformed the 
country’s economic prospects … It has added to the external resources for 
development on a scale undreamed of a year ago, resources which can and 
should be used over the next few years to promote the social objectives of 
Repelita II. (Arndt 1974: 1)
And to add to the amazing windfall, the pro-foreign investment policies 
introduced in the late 1960s had encouraged new investment in the oil sector 
in Indonesia, so the output of oil in Indonesia was rising rapidly as well. In
1966, oil production in Indonesia had been running at the modest level of 
around 470,000 bpd (barrels per day). By early 1974 production had expanded 
to nearly 1.4 million bpd. Thus in less than a decade, the price of oil had risen 
fourfold and production had risen threefold.
The impact of influx of ‘petro-dollars’ on this Indonesian economy during 
this period was dramatic. Oil revenues recorded in the budget rose more 
than tenfold between 1970 and 1977, from around Rp 100 billion (around $
260 million) in the 1970/71 budget to nearly Rp 1,700 billion (over $ 4,000 
million) in 1976/77. Many of the students who were demonstrating against 
foreign investment in the Malari riots would, during the next few years, 
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soon themselves begin to benefit substantially from the boost to Indonesia’s 
development prospects that the oil boom would bring.
But the receipts from the boom needed to be used well. And, broadly speaking, 
for much of the rest of the decade the oil revenues in Indonesia were indeed 
used relatively effectively. A number of other oil-exporting developing 
countries which benefitted from the oil boom did not spend the windfall of 
oil revenues so efficiently. However, in Indonesia much of the new revenue 
was used for development purposes in infrastructure and in rural development 
programs. These expenditures supported economic growth during subsequent 
decades.
The Pertamina crisis. The most dramatic exception to good public sector 
management during this period was the Pertamina crisis. The state-owned oil 
company Pertamina had been founded in 1968 from the merger of Pertamina 
and Pertamin, two state-owned enterprises which had carried on operations in 
the oil sector during the Sukarno era. By 1974 Pertamina had become perhaps 
the most well-known state-owned enterprise in Indonesia. Pertamina was led 
by a dynamic president director, Dr Ibnu Sutowo, who was known for his
‘can-do’ philosophy and record of delivering the goods. It was often said in 
Indonesia at the time that Pertamina was a ‘state within a state’ with a large 
budget that lacked transparency and which was often used for transactions 
outside of the national budget that president Soeharto saw as important.
It seems that the windfall of petrodollars during 1973 and 1974 tempted Ibnu 
Sutowo into high risk financial dealings (McCawley 1978). Programs were 
announced to expand Pertamina’s activities into new and diverse activities such 
as programs with the state-owned steel firm P.T. Krakatau and rice estates in 
South Sumatra. And, of much higher risk again, Pertamina took on short-term 
borrowings in international credit markets, apparently judging that the loans 
could be easily refinanced whenever they fell due. It seems that these financing 
arrangements worked well during 1973 and 1974 until international capital 
markets began to tighten with the onset of a recession of a major recession in 
rich nations in late 1974. Ironically, a major factor contributing to the recession 
in rich nations was the very increase in oil prices that had benefited Pertamina 
so handsomely in the preceding months. Pertamina was able to manage the 
cash-flow problems for some time, including by drawing on government 
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financing. However in March 1975 the company found itself unable to meet its 
financial obligations and the Indonesian government was called on to step in.
In the next few months it became clear that the debts that Pertamina had 
entered into were much larger than had first been realized. Early reports 
suggested that Pertamina’s short-term debts were not less than $1.5 billion. 
Later in the year, Bappenas (National Planning Board) Minister Professor
Widjojo Nitisastro made a comprehensive statement to parliament in which he 
reported that Pertamina’s total debts appeared to exceed $2.3 billion (Widjojo
2010: 301). But towards the end of 1975 rumours began circulating in Jakarta 
that the true debts were much higher, and perhaps as high as $6 billion or more. 
In early March 1976 Ibnu Sutowo was removed from his post as president 
director of Pertamina. These developments attracted much attention in the 
international press and did much damage to Indonesia’s economic and financial 
reputation during this period.
The speculation was finally ended in May 1976 when the Minister for 
Mining, Professor Mohamad Sadli, provided a frank and detailed statement to 
parliament. Professor Sadli reported that Pertamina had run up debts of over
$10 billion and that the debts were in the process of being pruned. Professor 
Sadli discussed how the situation had got out of hand in the following terms. 
He said:
It is true that the Government knew of, and moreover agreed to, various 
non- oil ventures being carried on by Pertamina … However, without the 
knowledge or agreement of the Government, Pertamina took on large and 
heavy financial commitments to finance business ventures … the majority 
of which were not economically justifiable nor directly connected with 
Pertamina’s main activities; examples of these ventures include the hire-
purchase of ocean tankers and other development projects which gave rise to 
large debts … (McCawley 1978: 12)
Professor Sadli went on to provide extensive details, and to outline measures 
that the government would take to overcome the problems. He later described 
the Pertamina problems as ‘the greatest crisis I faced as Minister of Mining’ 
(Sadli 2003: 134).
At the time, the Pertamina crisis was widely regarded as delivering a serious 
blow to the Indonesian economy. And, of course, the crisis reflected very 
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serious errors of judgement and internal accountability within the Indonesian 
government. But seen within a longer-term context, the Pertamina crisis was a 
passing problem. In important ways, the Indonesian economy and Indonesian 
governance systems are surprisingly resilient. Within a few years the main 
damage caused by the Pertamina crisis had been largely overcome. And many 
institutions are resilient. During the next few decades, Pertamina re-established 
itself as one of the leading corporate firms within Indonesia.
These events, then, were some of the main developments in the Indonesian 
economy in the period up to 1978 discussed in The Indonesian Economy 
during the Soeharto Era. During the next few years, into the early 1980s, the 
Indonesian economy grew strongly at rates of around 6-7 per cent per annum 
in real terms (Hill 1994). In taking stock of developments in the Indonesian 
economy during the Soeharto era to that stage, Anne Booth and I found it 
helpful to consider both the changes and continuities that seemed evident. 
And since these changes and continuities (we singled out five of each for 
discussion) are perhaps as marked today as they were three decades ago, it 
is useful to revisit the issues and to consider what might be said about them.
CHANGES
New technologies. In our edited collection Anne and I observed that
… one of the most important changes in Indonesia in the last decade has been 
the rapid introduction and adoption of new technologies in a broad range of 
economic activities and the impact they have had, particularly in rural areas... 
Intrusions of modern technology have also occurred in less expected areas. 
(Booth & McCawley 1981: 7)
The  same  comment  about  the  importance  of  new  technologies  could 
surely be said today although, during the last decade or so, the impact 
of new technologies has been more pronounced in the services sector than in 
agriculture.
It is something of a paradox that although economic nationalists in Indonesia 
often emphasize the need as much economic self-reliance as possible, 
Indonesia has benefitted enormously from the influx of global technology 
in key areas. Two of the most striking areas where this is evident are in the 
electronic and telecommunications sector, and in the domestic air travel 
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industry. In the electronic and telecommunications sector Indonesians across 
the nation have eagerly adopted all of the wonders of modern technology – 
computers, hundreds (probably thousands) of internationally-designed software 
programs, modern visual (TV) and sound systems, and especially mobile 
telephones. The adoption and widespread of mobile telephones, especially, has 
been quite remarkable. Even in far-flung parts of the archipelago, away from 
the towns and out in rural areas, local people use mobile phones for social and 
business purposes. Traders in rural markets use mobile telephones numerous 
times each day to check on commercial transactions -- and even travellers far 
out in the middle of the Java sea will use mobile phones to maintain contact 
with their families.
The transformation in the airlines sector, especially on domestic routes, has 
been just as astonishing. Indonesians are now on the move across Indonesia as 
never before. Between 2002 and 2012, domestic passenger movements carried 
by LCC (low-cost carrier) airlines in Indonesia increased at the extraordinary 
rate of 20 per cent per year. Airline terminals are bursting at the seams at major 
airports. The largest terminal in the country – the Soekarno-Hatta airport which 
serves Jakarta – was estimated to be operating at over 200 per cent of capacity 
in 2012. But somehow, most of the time, the systems continue to work. Flights 
are often delayed. Maintenance and standards are believed to often be below 
acceptable standards. But such is the priority that middle-class Indonesians 
now give to mobility that most travellers grumble a bit when things go wrong 
but, generally, put up with the inconvenience and risks and line up for flights 
anyway.
The rapid adoption of new technologies shows up in the national income 
figures. The share of the services sector – particularly the telecommunications 
and airline transport sectors – has grown rapidly during the past decade. The 
services sector, overall, now makes up over 50 per cent of GDP. This is a 
far cry from the situation in Indonesia in 1965 when output from agriculture 
contributed over 50 per cent of national income.
Institutional changes. Current development thinking places much emphasis 
on the importance of institutional change during the development process. In 
The Indonesian Economy during the Soeharto Era, Anne and I noted important 
institutional changes that had occurred during the 1970s. We pointed to the 
Bimas rice intensification program, other changes in the agricultural sector, and 
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the changes in the political and governance systems during the Soeharto era. 
Commenting on changes in national management, we observed that
…the political atmosphere of the day has affected the conduct of economic 
policies: trade union and labour activities have been suppressed; political 
activities have generally been closely controlled and the government-
sponsored political organisation Golkar has been the dominant political party; 
and conditions for government bureaucrats have been substantially improved. 
… But the cost has been that healthy discussion of development strategies 
has been greatly limited, and social groups who feel aggrieved have found it 
more difficult than even to make their voices heard in policy-making circles.
(Booth & McCawley 1981: 10)
Institutional arrangements in such things as the political atmosphere of the day 
and many of the procedures for the management of government have, today, 
been transformed since Anne Booth and I set down this description of the 
situation during the Orde Baru.
Two of the most sweeping changes during the Era Reformasi since 1998 
have been widely commented on – these are the dramatic liberalization of the 
political system during the Era Reformasi and the ‘big bang’ decentralization 
of processes of government in Indonesia. There have been many other 
institutional changes as well in recent years at both the macro (nation-wide) 
level and at the micro level of individual institutions. But the two changes 
of a dramatic expansion of the democratic space combined with remarkable 
decentralization have done much to transform the entire process of governance 
of the nation during the past decade.
Attitudes towards development priorities. National attitudes towards 
development priorities changed sharply in the late 1960s between the Sukarno 
and Soeharto eras. During the Sukarno era there was much emphasis on the 
need to combat colonialist influences in Indonesia and to curb the negative 
influences of foreign capitalism. During the first decade of the Soeharto era 
priorities altered dramatically. Much more emphasis was given to economic 
goals of stability and growth and almost all of the talk of opposing neo- 
colonialism disappeared from the national dialogue.
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Perhaps the distinguishing characteristic of Era Reformasi in attitudes towards 
development is that there has been a search for a middle ground between 
the priorities that the first two presidents of Indonesia set out for the nation. 
On the one hand, the need for sustained growth and for effective economic 
management is now widely accepted in Indonesia. On the other hand, the 
traditional nationalist concerns about the need to build up the strength of the 
domestic economy and the allegedly excessive influence of foreign investors 
in Indonesia are still evident. In recent years, senior ministers in Indonesia 
have tried to balance these concerns. A realistic evaluation of the alternative 
approaches would seem to be that both strands of thinking – a cautious and 
conservative approach toward economic management, and a radical view 
looking towards anti-capitalist reform – continue to vie for support within the 
senior echelons of government institutions in Indonesia today.
External economic constraints. Throughout the first two decades of the 
Indonesia’s existence as a new nation there were recurrent balance of payments 
problems. But in the first decade of the Soeharto Orde Baru government the 
situation changed dramatically. First, the inflows of foreign aid and investment 
in the early period of new regime strengthened the capital account and 
permitted increased levels of much-needed imports. And then the inflows of 
petro-dollars from the first oil boom transformed the balance of payments. In 
the late 1970s, Anne Booth and I took the view that
… it seems likely that the present reasonably healthy reserve situation will 
continue into the future – certainly balance of payments problems are unlikely 
to impose the same kind of restraint on policy-making as was the case in the 
fifties.
(Booth & McCawley 1981: 12)
For a time after the mid 1970s – indeed for the next two decades – it seemed 
that the balance of payments was no longer a constraint on development 
programs in Indonesia. Because of the surplus on the capital account during 
this period, Indonesia was able to maintain a high level of imports to support 
development and to sustain a deficit on the current account.
A sea-change occurred when the Asian financial crisis hit in 1997-98. 
Suddenly, volatility in capital flows crippled the external account forcing a 
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sharp devaluation of the rupiah and a sharp recession. The contraction in output 
in Indonesia 1998 was over 10 per cent of GDP.
For most of the period since the Asian financial crisis – in marked contrast to 
the two decades before the crisis – Indonesia has moved into surplus on the 
current account. Indeed, during the past decade it has become the accepted 
conventional wisdom amongst many policy-makers in Jakarta that a surplus on 
the current account is desirable and, amongst other things, reflects the strength 
of the Indonesian economy.
In fact it seems that there is little correlation -- either in Indonesia or in many 
other developing countries – between the surplus on the current account of the 
balance of payments and the overall growth rate. Some developing countries 
(such as China) grow rapidly while maintaining a surplus on the current 
account while others (such as India and Papua New Guinea) grow rapidly 
while maintaining a deficit. What is worrying, however, is that just in the last 
year or so – during 2012 and 2013 – some policy-makers in Jakarta appear to 
have become over-confident and have begun to take the view that Indonesia’s 
external balance is so sound that the strength on the external account can be 
taken for granted. However this approach carries substantial risks. The risks 
became evident during the first half of 2013 when unexpected strains on the 
balance of payments led to a fall in foreign exchange reserves and a marked 
depreciation of the rupiah.
Perhaps the main lesson from Indonesia’s experience with fluctuations in both 
the current account and the capital account since independence is that the 
Indonesian economy is vulnerable to external shocks. It would seem wise for 
policy-makers to aim to maintain foreign exchange reserves at comfortable lev- 
els and, in addition, to allow the foreign exchange rate to fluctuate reasonably 
freely when appropriate to help maintain equilibrium in the foreign current 
market. The alternative approach of trying to intervene heavily in the foreign 
exchange market when strains appear – which has been tried by authorities in 
Indonesia at various times – tends to fail. When Indonesian officials try to fight 
international markets, then international markets tend to win.
Internal economic management. The early and mid-1970s saw striking 
improvements in internal economic management. For one thing, the five-year 
planning process was strengthened with the preparation of Repelita I (Rencana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun II, or the First Five Year Development Plan) covering 
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the period 1969-1974. Perhaps more important from the point of view of 
regular economic management, the national budgeting process was signifi- 
cantly strengthened. National budgets became increasingly credible documents 
and the flow of economic statistics released by both the Ministry of Finance 
and the central bank, Bank Indonesia, became more reliable. And perhaps most 
important of all, president Soeharto appointed a team of respected ‘economic 
technocrats’ to the top economic positions within government.
This broad approach to economic management in Indonesia – of working 
to strengthen the bureaucratic processes, and of appointing policy-makers 
with strong economic skills – has endured since the late 1960s. It is true that 
there have been exceptions to the practice of appointing strong economists 
to the top ministerial positions. Nevertheless, the exceptions have been 
unusual. As a general rule the top team of economic ministers and advisers 
in Indonesia has, since the late 1960s, been consistently strong. Similarly, the 
quality of documentation about economic issues, including national budget 
transparency, has consistently improved. In this area of public governance, 
the reforms introduced during the early years of the Orde Baru administration 
have endured, and have strengthened over time.
CONTINUITIES
The edited collection which Anne Booth and I prepared identified five 
continuities in development policy in Indonesia. Looking back over these 
issues thirty years later, what is striking is how these subjects continue to 
resonate in public policy today. Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose.
Dualism. The phenomenon of dualism – that is, various types of divisions 
which mark sharp divisions across society – has long been a topic of discussion 
in the economic analysis of the Indonesian economy. In The Indonesian 
Economy during the Soeharto Era, Anne Booth and I suggested that
… few contemporary observers would deny that the dualistic features of 
the Indonesian economy … are still obvious today, and have in many ways 
been aggravated by … technological change … The large inflow of capital 
since 1968 has served to accentuate the differences between the modern 
and traditional sector of the urban economy, while the increased use of new 
technologies in rural areas has probably increased the dualistic nature of the 
indigenous rural economy …
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In recent years, if anything these divisions have become more marked. Today, 
it is appropriate to talk not so much of dualism, but rather multiple levels of 
economic, social and technical strata in Indonesia. These things are difficult 
to define and measure precisely but there are, perhaps, at least four distinct 
levels of economic society in Indonesia. These four levels are the following:
w		The EE sector. The ‘Elite and Expatriate’ sector which can be seen in the 
malls, the expensive cars, and the gated accommodation that this sector 
lives in.
w		The upper middle class sector. Citizens in this group live in comfortable 
and relatively safe accommodation in urban areas, often with air- 
conditioning, and usually own cars (often with drivers) and have regular 
staff to help maintain the household.
w		The urban rakyat. This group includes the vast majority of rakyat (ordinary 
people) who live in the main urban areas of Indonesia. Standards of living 
across this group vary widely from families who are managing quite well 
to lower-income groups who live a precarious existence.
w		The rakyat. Around 50 per cent of Indonesians live below the World-Bank 
nominated figure of $2.00 per day. The main part of the rakyat who fall into 
this group live outside of the largest urban areas and earn incomes wherever 
they can on a daily basis. Nearly all of the people in this group live and 
work in the ‘informal sector’.
The phenomenon of dualism, and indeed the emergence of further structures 
within dualism, is perhaps even more evident today than was the case during 
the 1970s in Indonesia.
Indigenous entrepreneurship. The issue of pribumi entrepreneurs relates 
to the question of who owns and controls the Indonesian economy. There 
is a widespread feeling in Indonesia that although political independence 
from foreign domination was achieved in 1945, there is still too much foreign 
control over the Indonesian economy. On one hand, it is easy to sympathize 
with the idea that Indonesian entrepreneurs rather than foreign companies 
should be dominant in Indonesia. On the other hand, it is puzzling that so 
few large private firms controlled by Indonesian managers and owners have 
emerged and flourished since independence was achieved 1945.
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In commenting on this issue Anne and I noted that one of the structural 
characteristics of the Indonesian economy was that it was dominated by 
thousands of ‘micro-enterprises’. In the decades since then, some pribumi 
entrepreneurs have managed to establish expanding corporate firms, but the 
number of well-known successful pribumi entrepreneurs is not large (Booth
1998: 320). Further, it is widely-believed that many of them have done well 
through their links with government and political parties rather than through 
their commercial success in genuinely competitive market-oriented ventures.
This apparent shortage of large, successful pribumi entrepreneurs, therefore, 
gives rise to a policy dilemma – what should government do to foster the 
growth of an Indonesian business class? There does not seem to be any easy 
answer to this question. It is hard to imagine how a pro-pribumi policy along the 
lines of that adopted in Malaysia could work successfully in Indonesia because 
economic and social conditions in Indonesia are so different. Yet other, less 
ambitious approaches designed to assist small-scale entrepreneurs in Indonesia 
have seldom been particularly successful. In the meantime, virtually every 
political leader in Indonesia continues to pay lip service, as a routine matter, to 
the goal of promoting small-scale entrepreneurship across the nation.
Inward-looking and outward-looking attitudes. Ever since independence 
there has been tension within Indonesian economic policies between inward- 
looking protectionist attitudes and more outward-looking internationalized 
approaches. The pendulum swung markedly away from inward-looking 
approaches in the early years of the Orde Baru government, and then swung 
back again somewhat after the Malari riots. There was a movement back 
towards more liberalised policies, especially in the manufacturing sector, 
during the 1980s, and then a more inward-looking mood developed towards 
the end of the Soeharto period.
These tensions in economic policy have continued to the present day. Recently, 
during 2011 and 2012, several years of strong economic growth, there were 
signs of a drift towards more protectionist policies in several areas of economic 
policy. Interventionist measures were announced in the agricultural sector to 
assist domestic producers, and foreign companies operating in the resources 
sector were directed to increase the level of domestic processing of resources 
before export regardless of whether the value added to resource exports in 
this was profitable or not. But marked pressures emerged on the balance of 
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payments in mid-2013 and there was a sudden market-determined depreciation 
of the rupiah. A policy package was announced in late August 2013 which 
emphasized the need for more internationally-competitive measures and which 
amounted to a move away from protectionist policies.
Fortunately, within limits, there are significant market-determined constraints 
in Indonesia which ensure that excessive levels of protection for tradable goods 
are difficult to maintain. The well-known quip that ‘Indonesia was made for 
free trade’ reflects the nature of Indonesia’s geography where there are long 
borders open to neighbouring countries. In the past, when prices in regulated 
markets inside Indonesia have diverged too far from regional prices, smuggling 
of goods (in both directions, depending on the nature of the regulation in 
Indonesia) has ensured that Indonesian prices have not diverged too far from 
international prices.
However it is true that disagreements between inward-looking and outward- 
looking policy-makers occur in many countries. The tug of war between 
nationalist ‘engineers’ and internationally-minded ‘technocrats’ in Indonesia 
(as the groups are sometimes called) seems likely to be a feature of Indonesian 
policy-making for many years to come.
The economic role of government. Writing in our edited collection about 
patterns of government policy in Indonesia, Anne and I noted ‘the absence 
of benign government intervention and the presence of malign intervention’. 
What we did not discuss in any detail are the practical restrictions imposed 
upon governments in Indonesia by the straitjacket of resource constraints that 
most branches of government must operate within.
A key problem that most parts of government in Indonesia must deal with 
is that their resources are very limited. At the national level, government 
spending in Indonesia in 2011 was less than $700 per capita. This compares 
with national expenditure in OECD countries such as the United States and 
Germany of around $20,000 per capita. Thus, for every $1.00 per person 
that the president of Indonesia can allocate to programs to support national 
priorities, the leaders of the United States and Germany can allocate around
$30. The shortage of resources is stark at the provincial level in Indonesia 
as well. In 2011 the average level of per capita expenditure by provincial 
governments in Java (excluding the special case of Jakarta) was a remarkably 
low level of $24 per capita. Similar levels of government in rich OECD 
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countries (in provinces, or province-like jurisdictions) often maintain levels 
of annual spending around $6,000- 8,000 per capita or more.
These figures are very sobering and prompt the question of what should be 
the role of governments in Indonesia given that their resources are so limited? 
It would seem that in order for governments in Indonesia to become more 
effective, governments need to define (and limit) their roles far more carefully 
than is currently the case. In particular, in planning for service delivery, key 
decisions are needed about which services will be provided directly by the 
government itself, or indirectly through reliance on service providers. More 
broadly, the extreme resource constraint facing most government agencies in 
Indonesia suggests that, often, agencies should move towards an improved 
regulatory role and reduce attempts to deliver services themselves.
Unemployment and poverty. The final area of continuity relates to problems 
of unemployment, poverty, and insecurity. Anne and I noted that these issues 
were ‘related through a chain of circular causation’ and that ‘it is … difficult 
to point to any sizeable government program that is likely to have an impact 
on these problems’.
It is true that in some directions, significant progress has been made in 
addressing these issues since the late 1970s. Levels of absolute poverty have 
dropped markedly in Indonesia, and most measures of human welfare point 
to notable progress. Further, in contrast to the situation in Indonesia in the
1970s, governments at all levels now recognize that poverty-reduction must be 
a focus of policy and encourage public discussion about appropriate measures. 
Yet mass poverty remains a very serious problem in Indonesia. World Bank 
estimates are that close to 50 per cent of Indonesians live on less than $2 per 
day. And perhaps the most important lesson of the Indonesian development 
experience since independence is that the single most effective measure that 
can be taken to alleviate mass poverty in Indonesia is to promote sustained 
economic growth.
CONCLUSION
Looking back at the overall view presented in the edited collection of articles 
in The Indonesian Economy during the Soeharto Era, it is hard to avoid the 
impression that our view of the prospects of the Indonesian economy was too 
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cautious. We perhaps underestimated the resilience and flexibility both of the 
economy overall, and of the institutions of government in Indonesia. And we 
were, arguably, too concerned about possible storm clouds ahead. For example, 
we recorded scepticism about the potential growth rate for Indonesia when we 
noted that
… the official growth target for Repelita III (1979-1984) is 6.5 per cent and 
some observers feel this may be difficult to achieve.
(Booth & McCawley 1981: 20)
In fact, the average growth rate of the Indonesian economy for the period from 
1980 until the onset of the 1997-98 financial crisis was only slightly below 
6.5 per cent (Van der Eng 2010). And at the conclusion of our collection, 
in surveying some of the potential problems ahead, we glumly observed that
… to the extent that the problems are avoided rather than faced up to, the 
prospects for stable development in Indonesia over the longer term seem 
bleak.
But as things have turned out, and despite the continuing existence of quite a 
few of the problems that we identified, Indonesia has continued to grow and to 
develop. One of Indonesia’s most well-known economists, Professor Mohamad 
Sadli, used to remind his friends that Indonesian policy-makers often have the 
useful ability of being able to ‘muddle through’. And indeed, Sadli was surely 
right (cited in Thee 2003). The myriad of actors involved in the Indonesian 
economy have indeed muddled through remarkably well since Anne Booth 
and I prepared The Indonesian Economy during the Soeharto Era at the end of 
the 1970s. With luck, this pragmatic approach to economic management will 
provide similar success for many decades to come.
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